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Empathic forecasting: How do we predict other
people’s feelings?
Monique M. H. Pollmann and Catrin Finkenauer
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
When making affective forecasts, people commit the impact bias. They overestimate
the impact an emotional event has on their affective experience. In three studies we
show that people also commit the impact bias when making empathic forecasts,
affective forecasts for someone else. They overestimate the impact an emotional
event has on someone else’s affective experience (Study 1), they do so for friends
and strangers (Study 2), and they do so when other sources of information are
available (Study 3). Empathic forecasting accuracy, the correlation between one
person’s empathic forecast and another person’s actual affective experience, was
lower than between-person forecasting correspondence, the correlation between one
person’s empathic forecast and another person’s affective forecast. Empathic
forecasts do not capture other people’s actual experience very well but are similar
to what other people forecast for themselves. This may enhance understanding
between people.
Keywords: Affective forecasting; Social projection; Accuracy; Impact bias.
People make affective forecasts to predict how they will feel about future
events. Often they do not make these forecasts in a social vacuum. They
discuss their wishes, hopes, or worries with others. These discussions invite
others to make empathic forecasts; others predict how the person will feel
about future events. To illustrate this, imagine Ann and Betty, who are
talking about their upcoming exams. Ann worries about failing because she
predicts that she would feel terrible for weeks if that were to happen. Betty
agrees with her: ‘‘Yes, I can imagine how you would feel, failing would be
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horrible!’’ In this scenario, Ann makes an affective forecast, she predicts her
affective experience following a future event. Betty makes an empathic
forecast, she predicts another person’s affective experience to a future event.
Empathic forecasts are difficult because people do not have direct access to
others’ affective experiences. Nevertheless, generally people make predic-
tions for others easily and readily and are commonly convinced that they do
so accurately (e.g., Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic, & Ross, 1990). While
empirical findings on affective forecasting are ample, little is known about
empathic forecasting. Research suggests that people perceive others’
affective experiences as less intense than their own (Miller & McFarland,
1987). Extending this finding to empathic forecasts, the current studies
investigated whether people forecast less intense affective experiences for
others.
Affective forecasting research traditionally examines biases, such as the
impact bias (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003), by comparing people’s mean affective
forecasts with their mean actual affective experience. Paralleling this
approach, one can examine biases in empathic forecasts by comparing one
person’s mean empathic forecasts with another person’s mean actual
affective experience. By focusing on discrepancies between means, however,
research tends to emphasise shortcomings in people’s forecasts (cf. Dunn &
Laham, 2006). To enhance our understanding of empathic forecasts, it is
important also to examine their strengths and their accuracy. Accuracy in
affective forecasting can be examined by investigating the correlations
between forecasts and experiences (e.g., Buehler & McFarland, 2001). Bias
and accuracy are independent concepts that can coexist (Dunn & Laham,
2006; Epley & Dunning, 2006; Gagne & Lydon, 2004). Acknowledging this
coexistence, the present paper sought to investigate both bias and accuracy
in empathic forecasting. We predicted that, although empathic forecasts are
biased by the impact bias, at the same time, they will be accurate as people
have general knowledge about others’ affective reactions.
Bias in affective forecasting
What people really want to know about the future is how happy they will be
(Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). To this end they make affective forecasts in which
they forecast their affective experience to future events. An exam can be such
an event, and when students are asked to forecast their affective experience
to the outcome of the exam, they are likely to forecast long-lasting happiness
or disappointment following success or failure, respectively (Buehler &
McFarland, 2001). Since researchers began to investigate the accuracy of
affective forecasts, however, it has become clear that affective forecasts are
biased (e.g., Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998; Mitchell,
Thompson, Peterson, & Cronk, 1997; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). Failing an
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exam may be disappointing but the experienced disappointment is less
intense and fades much faster than students’ forecast (Buehler & McFar-
land, 2001; Finkenauer, Gallucci, van Dijk, & Pollmann, 2007). This
tendency to overestimate the affective impact that future events will have
on our affective experience is called the impact bias (Gilbert, Driver-Linn, &
Wilson, 2002). Research has identified several sources for impact bias,
including focalism (Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000),
misconstrual (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003), and the psychological immune
system (Gilbert et al., 1998). Furthermore, often affective forecasts are based
on lay theories about how affective experiences unfold (Igou, 2004). The
range of experiences that give rise to the impact bias and people’s pervasive
tendency to commit it suggests that the impact bias occurs spontaneously
and typically outside of people’s awareness (e.g., Gilbert et al., 1998). Do
these findings on affective forecasting extend to empathic forecasting?
Bias in empathic forecasting
It has been suggested that people are able to detect biases in others’
judgements, which should enable them to make less biased forecasts for
others (Gilbert et al., 1998). Not much is known, however, about how people
predict others’ affective reactions. Evidence suggests that the influence of
emotions is perceived differently for the self and for others. Research
on social comparison and selfother judgements revealed that people
perceive their own affective experiences as more intense than those of other
people (Miller & McFarland, 1987). For example, others are thought to
experience less embarrassment and to be less influenced by it (Sabini,
Cosmas, Siepmann, & Stein, 1999; Van Boven, Loewenstein, & Dunning,
2005). Students think that they themselves are more concerned about
drinking than their peers (Suls & Green, 2003). More generally, people think
that others are less likely to experience guilt, sadness, anger, happiness,
shame, fear, and jealousy (Sabini et al., 1999). Recently, this bias has been
labelled the emotion intensity bias (Chambers & Suls, 2007) and it is thought
to stem from the fact that people have direct access to their own affective
experiences but only have indirect access to others’ affective experiences via
behaviour or facial expressions, for example. This accessible information
may not reflect the full intensity of the affective experience because people
often mask their feelings in social situations. The intensity of others’ affective
experience is therefore underestimated (Chambers & Suls, 2007).
It is not clear, however, whether the emotion intensity bias extends to
empathic forecasts. If people perceive affective experiences as less intense
does this mean that they also predict others’ affective experience to be less
intense? If this is the case, the typical overestimation of a future affective
reaction should be less pronounced when predicting the future affective
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reaction of someone else. The impact bias should therefore be smaller in
empathic forecasts than in affective forecasts. We do not think that the
impact bias will be completely wiped out by the emotion intensity bias,
however. People are typically not aware of the impact bias and they often
make affective forecasts based on intuitive theories about adaptation
processes and their relation to affect progression or duration (Igou, 2004;
Ross, 1989). It is likely that empathic forecasts are based on similar intuitive
theories (e.g., failing an exam is disappointing). We thus predicted that the
impact bias would emerge for empathic forecasts but that it would be less
pronounced than in affective forecasts.
To investigate whether people’s affective and empathic forecasts derive
from similar intuitive theories, we examined the within-person forecasting
correspondence between affective and empathic forecasts. This correspon-
dence is depicted in Figure 1 as the arrow between affective and empathic
forecast of one person. If both forecasts are made in similar ways the
structure of the affective forecast should resemble the structure of the
empathic forecast. As noted above, whether empathic forecasts are biased
and whether they resemble affective forecasts are theoretically and statisti-
cally different questions. The first question concerns the systematic over-
estimation of an affective experience and compares the mean affective
forecast with the mean affective experience. The second question concerns
the composition of the forecasts and examines whether different emotional
aspects are equally important in affective and empathic forecasts. In the
following, we will address the latter, correlational approach.
Person 1 Person 2
Affective forecasts Affective forecasts
Empathic forecasts Empathic forecasts
Affective experience Affective experienceAf
fe
ct
iv
e 
fo
re
ca
st
in
g 
ac
cu
ra
cy
Empathic forecasting accuracy
Within-person
forecasting correspondence
Betw
een-
pers
on
forec
astin
g co
rresp
onde
nce
Figure 1. Visualisation of the within- and between-person accuracy and correspondence. For sake of
clarity concepts are drawn for Person 1 only.
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Accuracy of empathic forecasts
Although the literature suggests that empathic forecasts are likely to be
biased, people are quite confident that they are accurate in predicting others
(Dunning et al., 1990; Realo et al., 2003; Swann & Gill, 1997). Their
confidence, however, is only weakly related and often even unrelated to
people’s actual ability to predict others’ internal states. Swann and Gill
(1997) conclude that ‘‘the confidence that people have in their impressions of
others is, at best, sporadically related to the accuracy of those impressions’’
(p. 755). How is it possible that people feel so confident about their ability to
predict others when they are in fact inaccurate? To answer this question, it is
necessary to have a closer look at forecasting accuracy, a methodological
look and a conceptual look.
A methodological look at accuracy. The scientific investigation of
affective forecasting accuracy has received less attention than it deserves
(Dunn & Laham, 2006). To investigate affective forecasting accuracy,
researchers correlated affective forecasts with affective experiences across
participants, thereby calculating a correlation for a group of participants
(e.g., Buehler & McFarland, 2001; Dunn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2003). In most
cases, researchers found a positive correlation, indicating that those
individuals who forecast stronger emotions also experienced stronger
emotions (Buehler & McFarland, 2001). These correlations, however,
characterise a sample rather than a specific individual or dyad. Indeed, it
is conceivable that people are more accurate in predicting people they know
than strangers (e.g., Stinson & Ickes, 1992), so sample-based correlations
may underestimate the actual accuracy of affective and empathic forecasts.
Item-based correlations allow us to circumvent this shortcoming by
calculating an accuracy score for each individual or dyad (cf. Bernieri,
Zuckerman, Koestner, & Rosenthal, 1994; Lou & Klohnen, 2005). Specifi-
cally, we compute correlation coefficients to establish how similar each
pattern of responses in a forecast is to each pattern of responses in an
experience. These item-based correlations thereby fully capture the degree to
which forecasts resemble affective experiences in terms of the relative
importance of different facets of the affective experience. For example, if
disappointment and relief were rated as more important than anger and
happiness in both forecast and experience, forecasting accuracy would be
high. Note that to prevent spurious correlations, it is necessary to reverse
score items that are framed negatively. People agree that a positive event
elicits more positive than negative emotions. Correlations based on the raw
scores would therefore not be informative. If all items have the same
982 POLLMANN AND FINKENAUER
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direction the correlations measure the extent to which some items are rated
higher than others in absolute terms.
We compute the correlation between affective forecasts and experiences,
affective forecasting accuracy, to examine the extent to which people are able
to forecast the pattern of responses for their own affective experiences (i.e.,
arrow between affective forecast and experience within one person in Figure
1). We compute the correlation between empathic forecasts and experiences,
empathic forecasting accuracy, to examine the extent to which people are able
to forecast the pattern of responses of others’ affective experiences (i.e.,
arrow between the empathic forecast of one person and the affective
experience of the other person in Figure 1).
The assessment of accuracy in interpersonal settings is vulnerable to a
number of problems (Cronbach, 1955; Gage & Cronbach, 1955). Accuracy
can be achieved not only by insight into one’s own or others’ future affective
experiences, but also because people respond to scales in a similar way, and/
or because they have stereotype knowledge about how people typically feel
about certain events (e.g., happy when passing an exam vs. disappointed
when failing an exam). By using item-based correlations we prevent the
inflation of accuracy scores due to similar response sets between two people
(Sillars, Pike, Jones, & Murphy, 1984). Specifically, they reflect the extent to
which the forecasting partner (i.e., the perceiver) can predict the pattern of
affective experiences of a target across different items. This makes these
within-dyad accuracy measures particularly appropriate in the present
context. The item-based correlations include stereotype knowledge, but it
should be noted that in the case of the current study stereotype knowledge is
of theoretical importance. Stereotype knowledge resembles the intuitive
theories people have about affective events (e.g., Igou, 2004; Ross, 1989).
Because we assume that affective and empathic forecasts are mainly based
on these intuitive theories, removing stereotype accuracy from the forecasts
would result in removing the very component we are interested in.
A conceptual look at accuracy. Conceptually, empathic forecasts allow
for another, new look at accuracy, because the empathic forecast of one
person can correspond to the affective forecast of the other person. We will
call this accuracy the between-person forecasting correspondence (see Figure
1). This new conceptualisation of accuracy may be especially important in an
interpersonal setting. To illustrate this, if Ann is afraid of failing her exam
and shares her concerns with Betty, it may be important for Betty to make an
empathic forecast that corresponds to Ann’s affective forecast. Such
between-person forecasting correspondence may help Betty to understand
Ann’s concern and signal acceptance and validation to Ann.
We propose that this type of accuracy is easier to achieve than empathic
forecasting accuracy. Forecasts and experiences arise from separate informa-
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tion processing systems (Dunn & Ashton-James, 2008). Affective forecasts
are proposed to stem from the rational system as they are based on logical
reasoning. Affective experiences, on the other hand, are proposed to stem
from the experiential system. Given these differences, forecasts and
experiences are likely to differ in their structure. Consequently, empathic
forecasts should resemble affective forecasts more than affective experiences.
Hence, we predicted that between-person forecasting correspondence would
be greater than empathic forecasting accuracy.
Hypotheses and overview of the current research
We predicted that people would commit the impact bias in empathic
forecasts but to a lesser extent than in affective forecasts. Additionally, we
predicted that we would find significant empathic forecasting accuracy and
significant between-person forecasting correspondence, with the latter being
stronger than the former. To test these predictions, in three studies, we asked
pairs of friends (Studies 13) and pairs of strangers (Study 2) to forecast
both their own affective experience and the other’s affective experience to
positive or negative feedback on an important test. Forecasts for the other
were made either before (Studies 1 and 2) or after (Study 3) participants had
undertaken the test and received feedback on it. We assessed affective
experiences following either positive or negative feedback. These designs
allowed us to examine the conditions under which people base an empathic
forecast on their affective forecast. Study 2 examined whether people base
their empathic forecasts for friends and for strangers on their affective
forecasts for themselves, and Study 3 examined whether people who
have access to a different source of information to make empathic forecasts,
namely their actual affective experience, would still base empathic forecasts
on affective forecasts.
STUDY 1
Study 1 sought to test the following hypotheses. First, we expected to
replicate the traditional impact bias in that people should overestimate
their positive experience following positive feedback and should over-
estimate their negative experience following negative feedback. Extending
previous research, we predicted that friends would show an impact bias in
their empathic forecasts for each other. Specifically, friends should over-
estimate one another’s positive experience following positive feedback and
should overestimate one another’s negative experience following negative
feedback. Furthermore, we investigated the accuracy of empathic forecasts
by measuring and comparing between-person forecasting correspondence
and empathic forecasting accuracy. We hypothesised that between-person
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forecasting correspondence would be greater than empathic forecasting
accuracy.
Method
Participants. Participants were recruited via posting flyers around
campus. The flyers announced one study for friends, inviting participants
to bring a friend. A total of 53 pairs of friends (16 malemale, 26 female
female, 11 mixed) participated in this study. Their age ranged from 17 to 30
years with an average of 20.02 years (SD2.34). They received t2.5 for their
participation. The mean duration of their friendship was 22.11 months
(SD40.38).
Design. This study used a 2 (Forecast: affective forecasts vs. empathic
forecasts)2 (Affective Experience: forecasted vs. actual)2 (Valence of
Feedback: positive feedback vs. negative feedback) factorial design with the
first two factors being within-subject factors and the last factor being a
between-subject factor. Friends were always in the same valence of feedback
condition, so that both friends would either both receive positive or both
negative feedback. The order in which participants made forecasts for
themselves and the friend was counterbalanced, but within each pair of
friends, the order of forecasting was the same.
Procedure and materials. Participants came to the lab together with a
friend, and both friends completed the study individually on computers.
Each pair of friends was randomly assigned to one of the two valence
conditions. Participants were told that they would answer a number of
questions about their friend but that the answers would be treated
confidentially and that the friend would never see them. They were
presented eight scenarios describing positive or negative emotion-eliciting
events (e.g., imagine you win t10,000 at the lottery, imagine you fail an
exam) and were asked to forecast their own and their friend’s affective
experience for four positive and four negative emotions (relieved, cheerful,
happy, proud, bad, disappointed, angry, sad) on a 7-point-scale. Included
in the eight scenarios was a scenario that was central to the research
question. This scenario asked participants to rate the intensity of their
emotions following a good or a bad performance on an important test
assessing their cognitive abilities. This scenario varied according to the
valence of feedback condition. After the first set of forecasts there was a
short filler task, and then the second set of forecasts started. Participants
who first made affective forecasts subsequently made empathic forecasts,
and vice versa.
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Following the forecasts, relationship duration and satisfaction were
measured. Relationship duration was measured by asking how many months
the friends had known each other. Relationship satisfaction was measured
by using a Dutch translation of the satisfaction, intimacy, and trust
subscales of the Perceived Relationship Quality Components Questionnaire
(Fletcher, Simpson, & Thomas, 2000). Items included questions such as:
‘‘How satisfied are you with the relationship with your friend?’’ answers were
given on a 7-point-scale.
After a 5-minute filler task for an unrelated study, participants were
introduced to the test. They read that it was a test to measure their cognitive
abilities and that this concept was a good predictor of success at college. To
highlight its importance, participants were told that based on the results of
the test they could receive advice about whether to pursue their education.
The test was the Dutch version of the Remote Associates Test (RAT), which
is designed to enable a powerful performance manipulation (McFarlin &
Blascovich, 1984). By manipulating the difficulty of RAT items, participants
can be given performance feedback that corresponds to their actual
performance. Participants’ task was to find an umbrella term for three
stimulus words. The original test consists of 35 sets of words that range in
difficulty. Participants in the negative feedback condition received the 16
most difficult items, and participants in the positive feedback condition
received the 16 least difficult items. After completing the test, participants
received bogus feedback about their performance. Participants in the
negative (positive) feedback condition were informed that they had answered
24% (87%) of the items correctly, which was translated into a score of 2.5
(8.5). After this feedback participants were asked to rate their affective
experience, using the same 7-point-scale of eight emotions used earlier for
the forecasts. Participants were told that this mood measurement was
necessary to control for mood effects. After reverse scoring the negative
items, reliability of the scale was a.96 for affective forecasts, a.96 for
empathic forecasts, and a.86 for affective experience. Subsequently
participants described in an open-answer format what they thought the
experiment was about. None of the participants correctly guessed the
purpose of the study. Finally, participants were debriefed and paid.
Results and discussion
Manipulation check. To check whether participants’ mood was influ-
enced by the feedback on the test, we compared the affective experience of
participants in the positive feedback condition with the affective experience
of participants in the negative feedback condition. A significant difference in
affective experience emerged, F(1, 104)21.23, pB.001, hp2.17. Partici-
pants in the positive feedback condition scored higher on the mood scale
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(M5.23, SD0.84) than participants in the negative feedback condition
(M4.42, SD0.98). This finding indicates that the feedback manipulation
was successful.
Bias in forecasts. To investigate whether participants committed the
impact bias in affective and empathic forecasts, we compared the mean
forecasted affective experiences with the mean actual affective experiences
after the test for self and friend. We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA
with Person (self vs. friend) and Affective Experience (forecasted vs. actual)
as within-subject factors and Feedback Condition (positive feedback vs.
negative feedback) as a between-subject factor.1 The analysis revealed a main
effect of Affective Experience, F(1, 104)15.90, pB.001, hp2.13, a main
effect of Feedback Condition, F(1, 104)364.26, pB.001, hp2.78, and,
most importantly, the hypothesised interaction between Affective Experience
and Feedback Condition, F(1, 104)147.92, pB.001, hp2.59.
We performed pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction to
investigate the nature of the interaction between affective experience and
condition. In the positive feedback condition, forecasted affective experi-
ences (M6.07, SD0.12) were more positive than actual affective
experiences (M5.23, SD0.09), F(1, 104)31.62, pB.001, hp2.23.
People thus overestimated their own and their friend’s positive affective
experience following positive feedback. In the negative feedback condition,
forecasted affective experiences (M2.76, SD0.11) were more negative
than actual affective experiences (M4.42, SD0.09), F(1, 104)138.24,
pB.001, hp2.57. People overestimated their own and their friend’s negative
affective experience following negative feedback. Thus, people commit the
impact bias in affective and empathic forecasts.
Contrary to our hypothesis we did not find a main or higher-order effect
for person, indicating that forecasts made for the self did not differ from the
forecast made for the friend. Possibly people have personalised knowledge
about affective experiences of a friend and know that they are as intense as
their own affective experiences.
Accuracy of forecasts. To investigate the accuracy of affective and
empathic forecasts, we compared forecasts and affective experiences by
calculating correspondence across the eight different emotions, leading to
one correlation score per person or pair (cf. Klohnen & Mendelsohn, 1998).
These item-based correlations were then transformed using the Fisher r to z
transformation for use in analyses and transformed back for reporting.
1 We also conducted an ANOVA including order as a between-subject factor. Because there
was no main effect of order of prediction or interaction effects with the other factors this factor
was excluded from the analyses.
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We followed the same procedure in the respective analyses in Study 2 and
Study 3.2,3
To investigate how accurate people are in forecasting their own affective
experience we calculated affective forecasting accuracy (i.e., within-person
correspondence between affective forecast and experience). We found a
substantial amount of affective forecasting accuracy, Mr.56 (range .54
to .97). The mean correlation was significantly greater than zero, t(1, 92)
10.94, pB.001. Thus, although affective forecasts are biased, they are also
accurate because people are able to forecast the pattern of their affective
experience.
To investigate how accurate people are in forecasting others’ affective
experience we calculated empathic forecasting accuracy (i.e., between-person
correspondence between forecast and experience). We also found a
substantial amount of empathic forecasting accuracy, Mr.44 (range
.55 to .96), which was significantly greater than zero, t(1, 91)9.29,
pB.001, So, although empathic forecasts are biased, they are also accurate
because people are able to forecast the pattern of their friend’s affective
experience.
To investigate the relation between affective forecasts and empathic
forecasts of one person, we calculated the within-person forecasting
correspondence (i.e., within-person correspondence between affective fore-
cast and empathic forecast). The average correlation between affective and
empathic forecasts of one person was Mr.66 (range.57 to .98). The
correlations were significantly greater than zero, t(1, 88)11.07, pB.001,
indicating that the two forecasts resembled each other.
To investigate whether the forecasts of two persons regarding the same
person were related, we calculated the between-person forecasting correspon-
dence (i.e., between-person correspondence between empathic forecast and
affective forecast). This item-based correlation reflects how much two
friends agree in their forecast of the affective experiences of one of them.
Mean between-person forecasting correspondence was Mr.58 (range
.46 to .97) and significantly greater than zero, t(1, 87)12.41, pB.001,
indicating that friends’ forecasts about the affective experience of one of
them were related.
Most importantly, we compared the two measures of accuracy and the
two measures of correspondence in a repeated-measures ANOVA with
2 To take statistical interdependence into account, we first estimated the variance explained
on the dyad level using a hierarchical linear model approach. No reliable effects of the dyad level
in explaining variance for the dependent measures emerged. Data in all three studies are hence
analysed on the individual level.
3 For some participants it was not possible to calculate the across-item correlation because
they gave the same response on every item. This is why degrees of freedom vary across analyses.
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the different correlations as within-subject factors. Of special interest were
the comparison of affective forecasting accuracy and empathic forecasting
accuracy and the comparison of empathic forecasting accuracy and between-
person forecasting correspondence. The first comparison investigated
whether people were more accurate in predicting themselves than others.
The second comparison investigated whether people were more accurate in
forecasting a friend’s experience or a friend’s own forecast. As can be seen in
Table 1, there was no difference in the accuracy of affective and empathic
forecasts. People are as accurate in predicting their own affective experience
as in predicting their friends’ affective experience. Thus, people seem to be as
biased and as accurate in their affective and their empathic forecasts.
Concerning the second comparison, between-person forecasting corre-
spondence was significantly higher than empathic forecasting accuracy, F(1,
77)7.37, pB.01, hp2.09. Participants were thus more accurate in
forecasting others’ forecasts than in forecasting others’ actual affective
experience. This correspondence between people’s forecasts may be func-
tional in interpersonal settings in that it is more important to agree with
someone on his or her affective forecast than to accurately forecast the
other’s affective experience. Between-person forecasting correspondence may
represent an on-line form of accuracy, because in everyday life it is most
likely to emerge in situations in which both partners are in the same situation
talking about the same upcoming event. In this sense, between-person
forecasting correspondence may help partners to empathise with each other
and be responsive to each other’s needs.
Relationship variables. To investigate how correspondence, empathic
forecasting accuracy, and between-person forecasting correspondence re-
lated to the characteristics of the relationship, we regressed these variables
on to relationship duration and satisfaction. None of the variables was
significantly related to either relationship satisfaction or duration, F(3, 71)
1.377, p.26 and F(3, 71)1.21, p.32, respectively. This suggests
TABLE 1
Mean scores for affective forecasting accuracy, empathic forecasting accuracy, within-
person forecasting correspondence, and between-person forecasting correspondence
of Studies 13
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3
Affective forecasting accuracy .56ab .58a .58a
Empathic forecasting accuracy .44a .44a .54a
Within-person forecasting correspondence .66c .89c .91b
Between-person forecasting correspondence .58b .78b .89b
Note: Within each study correlations not sharing a common subscript differ at pB.05.
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that correspondence, empathic forecasting accuracy and between-person
forecasting correspondence are independent of the time friends have known
each other and of how satisfied they are with the relationship.
STUDY 2
We found that people committed the impact bias for themselves and their
friend and that the strength of the impact bias did not differ across affective
and empathic forecasts. This finding was surprising given earlier results
showing that people perceive others’ affective experiences as less intense as
their own. We argued that people have personal information about their
friend, which may lead them to predict their friend’s affective experience as
being as intense as their own. To investigate this possibility, participants in
Study 2 forecast the affective experiences of a stranger versus a friend.
Additionally, we assessed participants’ mood before any manipulation had
taken place to investigate in more detail whether the feedback manipulation
led to changes in affect in the positive feedback condition, the negative
feedback condition, or both.
Method
Participants. Participants were recruited via posting flyers around
campus. Seventy participants participated in this study, ranging in age
from 17 to 36 years (M20.66, SD2.79). Approximately half of them
(N40) came to the lab with a friend. This group consisted of 4 malemale
friend couples, 12 femalefemale friend couples, and 4 mixed-sex friend
couples. They had been friends for an average of 28.28 months (SD53.19).
The other half of the participants came to the lab individually and were
paired with another participant whom they did not know. This group
consisted of 3 malemale couples, 7 femalefemale couples, and 5 mixed-sex
couples. Participants received t2.5 for their participation. As in Study 1,
pairs were randomly assigned to the same valence condition.
Design. This study used a 2 (Forecast: affective forecasts vs. empathic
forecasts)2 (Affective Experience: forecast vs. actual)2 (Valence of
Feedback: positive feedback vs. negative feedback)2 (Target of Forecast:
friend vs. stranger) factorial design with the first two factors being within-
subject factors and the latter two factors being between-subject factors.
Dyads were always in the same valence of feedback condition, so that both
received either positive or negative feedback.
Procedure and materials. The procedure was the same as in Study 1, with
the following exceptions. First, for stranger dyads no relationship-relevant
990 POLLMANN AND FINKENAUER
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
 A
ms
te
rd
am
] 
At
: 
12
:0
3 
24
 N
ov
em
be
r 
20
10
variables were assessed. Second, because we found no effect of the order of
prediction in Study 1, the order in which participants made the forecasts was
now the same for everyone, all participants started with the affective forecast
and then made the empathic forecast. Third, a mood pre-measure was
included that assessed participants’ mood at the beginning of the experiment
using the same mood scale as in Study 1. After reverse scoring of the
negative items, reliability of the mood scale was a.96 for affective
forecasts, a.96 for the empathic forecasts, a.81 for the mood pre-
measure, and a.88 for the actual affective experience.
Results and discussion
Manipulation check. To check whether participants’ mood was influ-
enced by the feedback on the test, we compared participants’ mood at the
beginning of the experiment with their actual affective experience following
the positive or negative feedback. A significant interaction between Time of
Measurement (before vs. after the feedback) and Valence of Feedback
(positive vs. negative) emerged, F(1, 68)26.47, pB.001, hp2.28. Simple
effects analyses yielded no significant difference in mood before participants
received feedback, F(1, 68)0.23, p.52, hp2.01. There was, however, a
significant difference in actual affective experience after participants had
received either positive or negative feedback, F(1, 68)17.15, pB.001, hp2
.20. Participants’ mood in the negative feedback condition decreased
significantly, F(1, 68)42.09, pB.001, hp2.38 (M5.28 vs. 4.31), while
participants’ mood in the positive feedback condition did not change
significantly, F(1, 68)B1 (M5.13 vs. 5.23). Thus, the negative feedback
manipulation was more powerful than the positive feedback manipulation.
Bias in forecasts. To investigate whether participants committed the
impact bias for themselves, for a friend, and for a stranger, we conducted a
repeated-measures ANOVA with Affective Experience (forecast vs. actual)
and Person (self vs. other) as within-subject factors and Feedback Condition
(positive feedback vs. negative feedback) and Target (friend vs. stranger) as
between-subject factors. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Affective
Experience, F(1, 66)11.13, pB.01, hp2.14, a main effect of Feedback
Condition, F(1, 66)344.98, pB.001, hp2.84, and, most importantly, the
hypothesised interaction between Affective Experience and Feedback
Condition, F(1, 66)125.19, pB.001, hp2.66. Mirroring the results of
Study 1, participants’ forecasted affective experience in response to positive
feedback was more positive than their actual affective experience, F(1, 66)
32.05, pB.001, hp2.33 (M6.12 vs. M5.25). Conversely, participants’
forecasted affective experience in response to negative feedback was more
negative than their actual affective experience, F(1, 66)101.61, pB.001,
EMPATHIC FORECASTING 991
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
 A
ms
te
rd
am
] 
At
: 
12
:0
3 
24
 N
ov
em
be
r 
20
10
hp2.61 (M2.73 vs. M4.34). People thus committed the impact bias for
themselves as well as for others.
Additionally, we found a main effect of the Target of Forecast, F(1, 66)
4.96, pB.05, hp2.07. The overall score given on the mood scale was higher
when the target was a stranger (M4.74) than when the target was a friend
(M4.48). This finding is theoretically not meaningful, however, because it
was not qualified by any interactions and thus included forecasts and
experiences as well as judgements about the self. We predicted that forecasts
for a stranger would be less extreme. Thus, we should have found an
interaction between Target, Affective Experience, Person, and Condition,
with lower scores for forecasts about strangers in the positive feedback
condition and higher scores in the negative feedback condition. The fact that
we did not find this interaction indicates that when forecasting the affective
experience of others, people overestimated the impact of the experience,
independent of whether they knew the target or not.
Finally, the ANOVA revealed an interaction effect between Person and
Time, F(1, 66)4.16, pB.05, hp2.06, that indicates that forecasts (but not
experiences) made for the self are less positive than forecasts made for the
other person (M4.26 vs. M4.59). This finding is hard to interpret
because it was not qualified by the feedback condition. The forecast affective
experience for someone else was not more extreme, as we predicted, but more
positive overall. Because we did not find this effect in Study 1 its robustness
is questionable.
In summary, Study 2 showed that people commit the impact bias for
themselves to the same extent to which they commit it for others. Extending
the results of Study 1, Study 2 showed that the impact bias appears for friends
and strangers. This finding is surprising because people have much more
personalised knowledge about themselves and their friends than strangers.
This knowledge would enable them, for example, to take earlier experiences
into account when making forecasts for themselves or their friends. Rather
than using this knowledge, however, people seemed to use the same strategy
to make forecasts for themselves, for a friend, and even for a stranger.
Accuracy of forecasts. Similar to Study 1, we investigated the accuracy
and correspondence of affective and empathic forecasts. Additionally, we
tested whether the empathic forecasting accuracy differed for friends and
strangers. The magnitude of affective forecasting accuracy, empathic
forecasting accuracy, within-person correspondence, and between-person
correspondence paralleled those found in Study 1 (see Table 1). All
correlations differed significantly from zero (all p-valuesB.01).
There was no significant difference in empathic forecasting accuracy for
friend and stranger target, F(1, 63)B1. It thus seems that even if they do not
know the other person, people are still accurate about how that person will
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feel after doing badly on an important test. Furthermore, the amount of
between-person forecasting correspondence did not differ for friends and
strangers, F(1, 63)B1, indicating that people have considerable knowledge
about how miserable another person expects to feel after doing badly on an
important test.
Finally, we compared the different correlations in a repeated-measures
ANOVA. As can be seen in Table 1, replicating Study 1, we found no
difference between affective forecasting accuracy and empathic forecasting
accuracy. Also replicating Study 1 and consistent with expectations,
between-person forecasting correspondence was significantly higher than
empathic forecasting accuracy, F(1, 64)17.06, pB.001, hp2.21. In an
interpersonal setting people are thus mainly accurate because they agree on
their forecasted affective experiences.
Relationship variables. Regression analyses revealed that, again, em-
pathic forecasting accuracy and within-person and between-person forecast-
ing correspondence were unrelated to relationship duration and satisfaction,
both FsB1.
STUDY 3
Studies 1 and 2 found consistent evidence that people adopt the same strategy
to make affective forecasts for different targets. We designed Study 3 to
investigate whether they change their strategy as a function of the
information available in the forecasting situation. To provide participants
with a different source of information on which they could base their
empathic forecasts, they made empathic forecasts immediately after they had
experienced the event themselves. Hence, participants could use their actual
affective experiences, rather than their intuitive theories, as an anchor for
their empathic forecasts. This strategy was expected to reduce the impact bias
and lead to higher empathic forecasting accuracy, because participants’ own
actual affective experiences should be a good anchor for the actual affective
experiences of the other. The literature suggests that people make different
forecasts after the test, because they are likely to rationalise the negative
outcome (Wilson, Meyers, & Gilbert, 2001, 2003). We therefore predicted
that people would base their affective forecast for their friends on their own
actual affective experience when making the forecasts after the experience.
Method
Participants. Participants were recruited via posting flyers around cam-
pus. The flyers announced one study for friends, inviting participants to bring
a friend. A total of 20 pairs of friends (6 malemale, 11 femalefemale, 3
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mixed) participated in this study. Their age ranged from 17 to 26 years (M
19.55, SD1.89). They received t2.5 for their participation. The mean
duration of their friendship was 28.05 months (SD26.70).
Design. This study used a 2 (Forecast: affective forecasts vs. empathic
forecasts)2 (Affective Experience: forecast vs. actual)2 (Valence of
Feedback: positive feedback vs. negative feedback) factorial design with the
first two factors being within-subject factors and the last factor being a
between-subject factor. Friends were always in the same valence of feedback
condition, so that both friends received either positive or negative feedback.
Procedure and materials. The procedure and the materials were the
same as in Study 2 with the following exception: Participants always made
the forecast for their friend after they had received their own feedback on the
test. The reliability of the mood scale was again high, after reverse scoring of
the negative items reliability of the scale was a.96 for affective forecasts,
a.97 for the empathic forecasts, a.89 for the mood pre-measure and
a.91 for the actual affective experience.
Results
Manipulation check. The feedback manipulation was successful, because
participants’ mood in the negative feedback condition decreased signifi-
cantly, F(1, 38)31.05, pB.001, hp2.45 (M5.51 vs. 4.52), and partici-
pants’ mood in the positive feedback condition increased significantly, F(1,
38)5.35, p.03, hp2.12 (M5.08 vs. 5.49).
Bias in forecasts. The main question of Study 3 was whether participants
would still commit the impact bias for others when they had just experienced
the event themselves. A repeated-measures ANOVA with Affective Experi-
ence (forecast vs. actual) and Person (1 vs. 2) as within-subject factors and
Feedback Condition (positive feedback vs. negative feedback) as a between-
subject factor yielded a main effect of Affective Experience, F(1, 38)45.65,
pB.001, hp2.55, and a main effect of Feedback Condition, F(1, 38)
179.59, pB.001, hp2.83, which were qualified by the hypothesised
interaction between Affective Experience and Feedback Condition, F(1,
38)145.97, pB.001, hp2.79. Simple effects analyses revealed that
participants’ forecasted affective experience in response to positive feedback
was more positive than the actual affective experience, F(1, 38)14.18, pB
.001, hp2.27 (M6.08 vs. 5.49). Participants’ forecasted affective experi-
ence in response to negative feedback was less positive than the actual
affective experience, F(1, 38)177.44, pB.001, hp2.82 (M2.46 vs. 4.52).
Importantly, these effects were not qualified by an interaction with Person.
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Thus participants overestimated their own and others’ affective experience,
even after they had just experienced the event themselves.
Basis of the empathic forecast. In this study the empathic forecast was
made after the affective experience. This allowed participants to base the
empathic forecast on their affective experience. If this were the case,
empathic forecasts should correspond more strongly to affective experiences
than to affective forecasts. To investigate this question, we regressed
empathic forecasts onto own affective forecasts and own actual experiences.
Affective forecasts that participants made for themselves significantly
predicted their empathic forecasts (b.91, pB.001). Participants’ own
actual affective experiences did not contribute to explaining variance in
empathic forecasts above and beyond the variance that was explained by
affective forecasts (b.01, p.94). These results suggest that people do
not take their own affective experiences into account when making empathic
forecasts. Even after experiencing a situation that was similar to the one that
had to be forecasted, empathic forecasts still seemed to be based on the same
intuitive theory as affective forecasts. This result may seem surprising
because information about people’s own affective experience should be more
readily accessible for participants than information about their own forecast.
Participants made affective forecasts, underwent the affective experience,
and then made the empathic forecast. So, the affective forecast, which is the
more distal predictor, performed better than the affective experience, which
is the more proximal predictor. These results suggest that people’s tendency
to make empathic forecasts in the same way that they make affective forecast
is very strong and not easily overridden by recent affective experiences.
Why do people not take their experiences into account? It is possible that
taking one’s own experiences into account or even taking experiences of the
other person into account is a more effortful way to make an empathic
forecast. When it comes to affective forecasts, people do not spontaneously
base them on their past experiences (Wilson et al., 2001). For example, when
Betty forecasts how she would feel after failing the exam, she could try to
remember all the occasions that she failed an exam and take them into
account. However, this process would require cognitive effort and motivation
and it is more likely that Betty, like people in general, will opt for easy
mental strategies over effortful ones (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). So, Betty
makes a rather ‘‘quick and dirty’’ forecast that is somewhat biased. Similarly,
if Betty were to forecast Ann’s affective experience after failing the exam, she
could try to remember all the occasions that Ann failed an exam and told
her about it. However, this would also require considerable cognitive effort.
If Betty is not motivated to invest this effort into her own affective forecasts,
it is unlikely that she would be motivated to invest it into empathic forecasts.
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Accuracy of forecasts. Also in this study we investigated and compared
the accuracy and correspondence of affective and empathic forecasts (Table
1). All correlations were significantly greater than zero, all p-valuesB.01. An
ANOVA revealed that, again, between-person forecasting correspondence
was significantly higher than empathic forecasting accuracy, F(1, 37)
17.04, pB.001, hp2.32 (see Table 1 for an overview of the comparisons).
Thus, empathic forecasts more strongly resemble the pattern of affective
forecasts than the pattern of affective experiences, even if the affective
experience is readily available in people’s memory when making the
empathic forecasts.
Relationship variables. Again we found no link between empathic
forecasting accuracy and within-person and between-person forecasting
correspondence and relationship duration and satisfaction in the regression
analysis, both FsB1.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Across three studies we found consistent support for our hypothesis that
empathic forecasts can be biased and accurate at the same time. Empathic
forecasts are biased because the affective experience of the other person is
overestimated. Empathic forecasts are accurate because they correspond to
the other’s affective experience.
Bias in forecasts
Our findings extend the literature on affective forecasting to interpersonal
settings by showing that the well-established impact bias in affective
forecasts also occurs for empathic forecasts. People overestimate others’
positive experience after positive feedback and overestimate others’ negative
experience after negative feedback. Importantly, they do so to the same
extent as they overestimate their own affective experience.
According to the emotional intensity bias people tend to perceive others’
affective experiences as less intense than their own (Miller & McFarland,
1987). However, when making empathic forecasts, the predicted affective
experience of a friend and a stranger was as intense as the predicted affective
experience of the self. It should be noted that in a typical study on
the emotional intensity bias the other person is often an average other. In
our study the other person was personalised, either as their friend or a
stranger they met just before the experiment. Possibly a personalised other is
seen as more similar to the self and therefore forecasts for that person are
made similarly to forecasts for the self. The similarity between affective and
empathic forecasts is further underlined by the high correspondence between
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them. Furthermore, empathic forecasting accuracy was similar for friends
and strangers and did not vary as a function of relationship length. If people
were to use personalised information to make empathic forecasts, forecasts
for a friend should be more accurate, especially for long-lasting friendships.
As it is, affective forecasts seem to be based on an intuitive theory applied to
forecasts for the self, friends, and strangers.
Indeed, affective and empathic forecasts may both be based on the same
intuitive theory of how people react to emotional events (cf. Igou, 2004;
Ross, 1989). People base both forecasts on common knowledge (e.g.,
receiving positive feedback on a test will lead to certain positive emotions).
Alternatively affective forecasts may be projected onto others and thus
empathic forecasts may be derived from affective forecasts. Projection is a
pervasive strategy used by people for different social judgements (Ames,
2004; Hoch, 1987; Hodges, Johnsen, & Scott, 2002; Ross, Greene, & House,
1977; Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003). Our design did not allow us to
disentangle whether high correspondence between affective and empathic
forecasts is due to projection or due to the fact that people base both
forecasts on the same intuitive theory. More research is needed to investigate
the processes underlying empathic forecasts.
In all three studies, the impact bias was more pronounced in the negative
feedback condition. Although we did not directly compare whether it was
stronger for negative events, these results are in line with earlier research
(Finkenauer et al., 2007; Gilbert et al., 1998), highlighting that the same
processes that lead to the impact bias in affective forecasts may lead to the
impact bias in empathic forecasts. Future research should examine whether
processes such as immune neglect and focalism, which underlie the impact
bias in affective forecasts, also explain the occurrence of the impact bias in
empathic forecasts (Wilson & Gilbert, 2005).
Accuracy of forecasts
Although people’s empathic forecasts are biased, they are also accurate. We
investigated two types of accuracy, empathic forecasting accuracy and
between-person forecasting correspondence. We found that between-person
forecasting correspondence was higher than empathic forecasting accuracy.
We believe that between-person forecasting correspondence may be more
important than empathic forecasting accuracy. When talking with someone
about an upcoming event and perhaps confiding one’s worries about its
potential negative outcomes, the other could be high in empathic forecasting
accuracy or high in between-person forecasting correspondence. The con-
sequences of these two forms of accuracy for both relationship partners and
the relationship between them may be very different. If the other shows high
empathic forecasting accuracy, he or she foresees that the impact of the event
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will not be as intense as predicted by the confiding person. Therefore he or
she is likely to downgrade the need to worry. This may elicit feelings of not
being understood in the confiding person and, even more importantly, may
undermine the potential beneficial effects of biased affective forecasting. To
illustrate, anticipating the negative consequences of a future event can
motivate people to work hard to avoid a negative outcome of the event
(Finkenauer et al., 2007). Downgrading the need to worry may have the
paradoxical effect of reducing the other’s motivation to work hard, thereby
possibly even increasing the likelihood of a negative outcome (cf. Norem &
Illingworth, 2004). If the other shows high empathic forecasting accuracy
correspondence, however, he or she will overestimate the impact of the event
similar to the confiding person. Therefore he or she is likely to validate the
need to worry. On the relationship level, between-person forecasting
correspondence could lead to feelings of being understood and the perception
that the partner is responsive to and supportive of the self (Reis, Clark, &
Holmes, 2004). On the individual level, between-person forecasting corre-
spondence may validate people’s appraisal of future events and strengthen the
motivation to avoid a negative outcome of the event. High between-person
forecasting correspondence may therefore be more functional in an inter-
personal setting than high empathic forecasting accuracy.
We can only speculate about the cognitive and motivational processes
underlying the fact that affective forecasts of one person and empathic
forecasts of a friend are related. It is possible that these processes are entirely
cognitive. People may use the same strategy for the self and the other
because it is easy and effortless, whereas adjusting a forecast by taking the
situation of a friend into account involves an extra step (cf. Van Boven et al.,
2005). However, these processes may also be motivational. If people try to be
supportive and to motivate the other by highlighting the extreme con-
sequences of a certain event and thus agree with the affective forecast of the
other, this is probably a strategy that is appreciated by the other and
rewarding for the self. Future studies should investigate the motivational
underpinnings of between-person forecasting correspondence more system-
atically.
Although our theoretical reasoning underlines individual and social
underpinnings of empathic forecasting, situational and contextual factors
cannot be excluded. To illustrate this, in line with our suggestion that
forecasts are, at least partly, based on intuitive theories, empathic forecasting
can be assumed to be easier for situations that are concrete and normative
(e.g., gaining or losing money on the stock market, succeeding or failing an
examination, watching a comedy) than for situations that are abstract and
complex (e.g., relational break-ups, moving to a new city, becoming a
parent). More research is needed to systematically investigate those
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situational and contextual factors that facilitate rather than impede
empathic forecasting.
We argued that between-person forecasting correspondence can lead to
feelings of agreement and of being understood. This should be beneficial for
the relationship and therefore should enhance relationship satisfaction
(Murray, Holmes, Bellavia, Griffin, & Dolderman, 2002). We found no
direct link between either relationship satisfaction and duration and
empathic forecasting accuracy or between-person forecasting correspon-
dence, however. This lack of findings sheds doubts on the potential beneficial
effects of high between-person forecasting correspondence for the relation-
ship in the long run. Yet, participants in our studies did not communicate
their empathic forecasts to each other. As a consequence, there was no chance
for the positive effects of perceived between-person forecasting correspon-
dence to emerge. Future research should investigate the positive effects of
between-person forecasting correspondence by actually letting people talk
about their forecasts. We predict that people will show a preference for others
who are high in between-person forecasting correspondence compared to
those who are high in empathic forecasting accuracy.
Conclusions
Foreseeing the future is impossible. However, people can and do make
forecasts about the future. Empathic forecasts may be only a small slice of all
the forecasting work that people do in their lives. However, empathic
forecasts may help us to understand others. Our research shows that to reach
this goal, people do not even have to try to be accurate. Even with biased
empathic forecasts, people can achieve high levels of between-person
forecasting correspondence.
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